First-order logic and some existential sentences by McLeod, Stephen K
 Disputatio, Vol. IV, No. 31, November 2011 
Received on 19 October 2010, and 10 May 2011 
First-order logic  
and some existential sentences 
Stephen K. McLeod 
University of Liverpool 
Abstract 
‘Quantified pure existentials’ are sentences (e.g., ‘Some things do not 
exist’) which meet these conditions: (i) the verb EXIST is contained in, 
and is, apart from quantificational BE, the only full (as against auxiliary) 
verb in the sentence; (ii) no (other) logical predicate features in the sen-
tence; (iii) no name or other sub-sentential referring expression features 
in the sentence; (iv) the sentence contains a quantifier that is not an oc-
currence of EXIST. Colin McGinn and Rod Girle have alleged that stan-
dard first-order logic cannot adequately deal with some such existen-
tials. The article defends the view that it can. 
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1. Quantified pure existentials 
Existential sentences have stimulated plentiful discussion in logic and 
ontology. This article draws attention to a less-commonly discussed 
variety of them, examining its bearing upon logic and, less directly, 
upon ontology. Let us start with some matters of classification. 
Following the notational convention of Palmer (1990: 29), ‘EXIST’ 
is an expression for a lexeme, encompassing all forms of the verb. 
Existential sentences include sentences that feature EXIST (or its 
counterpart in another language) as a grammatical predicate. Bran-
quinho distinguishes, as follows, between three types of such existen-
tial sentences: 
(a) Singular existential sentences in which the grammatical predi-
cate ‘exist’, preceded or not preceded by an expression of ne-
gation, is combined with a logically simple singular term, espe-
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cially a proper name; [e.g.] …‘Homer exists’ and ‘Vulcan does 
not exist’. 
 
(b) Singular existential sentences in which the grammatical predi-
cate ‘exist’, preceded or not preceded by an expression of ne-
gation, is combined with a logically complex singular term, es-
pecially a singular definite description; [e.g.] …‘The author of 
“The Iliad” exists’ and ‘The tenth planet of the solar system 
does not exist’. 
 
(c) General existential sentences in which the grammatical predi-
cate ‘exist’, preceded or not preceded by an expression of ne-
gation, is combined with a simple or complex general term (or 
monadic predicate); [e.g.] …‘Winged mammals exist’, ‘Uni-
corns do not exist’. (Branquinho 1998: 5)1 
Branquinho mentions, but does not classify, such sentences as ‘There 
are no non-existent objects’ (Branquinho 1998: 4) and ‘There are 
things which do not exist’ (Branquinho 1998: 11). Branquinho does 
not observe that these sentences do not fall into types (a)–(c). Let me 
add a fourth type, to which ‘There are things which do not exist’ 
belongs. McGinn calls sentences of this fourth type ‘unspecific’ 
existentials and he views them as ‘test cases for any theory of exis-
tence’ (McGinn 2000: 28). 
(d) A sentence is a quantified pure existential iff it meets all of 
the following conditions: (i) the verb EXIST is contained 
in, and is, apart from quantificational BE, the only full (as 
against auxiliary) verb in the sentence; (ii) no (other) logi-
cal predicate features in the sentence; (iii) no name or 
definite description features in the sentence; (iv) the sen-
tence contains a quantifier that is not an occurrence of EX-
IST.2 
E.g.: 
(1) Everything exists. 
(2) Something exists. 
 
1 The translations are mine. 
2 Quine’s notion of a ‘pure existential’ (Quine 1982: 183) is unrelated. 
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(3) Some things do not exist. 
I do not suggest that types (a)–(d) encompass all existential sentences, 
or that Branquinho intended types (a)–(c) to do so. ‘There are no 
non-existent objects’ does not fall into any of these types, since it 
does not contain EXIST. Moreover, there are existential sentences 
which do not employ EXIST or a word that is derived from it. Such 
sentences include ‘There are Germans’ and ‘Some men are German’. 
In contrast with sentences of types (a)–(d), it is a matter of some 
philosophical controversy as to whether sentences like these really 
are, as Frege 1883? argued, existential. 
Adherents of the ‘Frege-Russell view’ of existence hold that all 
meaningful sentences of types (a)–(d) are translatable into formulas of 
standard first-order logic in which ‘’, with a variable, captures the 
logical meaning of EXIST. This stance is a consequence of their view 
that the use of the quantifier forms a higher-order predicate and that 
existence is never to be expressed via a first-order predicate. Never-
theless, the thesis that ‘’ is an existential (rather than an existentially 
neutral) quantifier fit for translating all such existential sentences into 
formulas of standard first-order logic does not entail the Frege-
Russell view.3 
Branquinho 1998 observes that sentences of types (b) and (c) fairly 
readily lend themselves to this sort of translation, whereas sentences 
of type (a) are more troublesome.4 Our current focus, however, is 
upon type (d) sentences. 
 
3 McGinn and Girle favour what I will call a ‘particularist’ interpretation of 
‘some’ and its formal analogue ‘’. On this view, both ‘some’ and the symbol 
used to represent it in a formal language are to be read as existentially neutral. 
Priest writes: ‘what is most naturally called the particular quantifier (being the dual 
of the universal quantifier) should not be read as “there exists” […] it should simply 
be read as some, leaving it open whether the some in question exists or not’ (Priest 
2008: 42). By ‘particularism’ I intend the view that the quantifier should be read 
in the second way. Priest holds further that the quantifier ‘should not be read as 
[…] “there is”, there being no real difference between being and existence’. Not 
everyone who adopts particularism will agree with Priest about that. 
4 Compare Miller (2002: 40), though the account of (neo-)Meinongianism 
provided by Branquinho (1998: 11–3) shows that Miller is over-optimistic in 
commenting that ‘There is nothing controversial about Russell’s treatment of 
general existential propositions’ (Miller 2002: 40). 
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If we are supposed to symbolize EXIST using ‘’, we might be per-
plexed as to how to translate type (d) existentials into standard first-
order logic. Indeed, some philosophers hold that (at least some) 
sentences of type (d) cannot adequately be dealt with using the re-
sources of that logic. 
While the main aim of McGinn (2000: Chapter 2) is to attack the 
Frege-Russell view of existence, part of his argument suggests that 
standard first-order logic is inadequate with respect to type (d) sen-
tences. In relation to (2) (‘Something exists’), McGinn writes: ‘If we 
try to translate the sentence in the standard way we get the gibberish, 
“x( x)”, with no predicate to write down’ (McGinn 2000: 27). Now 
McGinn (2000: 23, 32–35) holds that it is open to us, in respect of 
some existentials, to interpret ‘’ as having a dual function defined by 
reference to the particular quantifier ‘for some’ and the primitive 
existence predicate ‘exists’. However, even this reading of the sym-
bol does not, on his view, afford us the opportunity to formalize type 
(d) sentences. Rather, he takes it that an adequate formalization of (2) 
must feature a primitive existence predicate. Translation into stan-
dard first-order logic treats all occurrences of EXIST as formalizable 
using ‘’ (interpreted as ‘for some’) with other symbols, but not 
including a primitive first-level existence predicate. On McGinn’s 
view that logic, with that approach to translation, leaves us lost for a 
lexical item that can do the work required to formalize EXIST as it 
occurs in (2). Of course, as Baumgartner & Lampert (2008: 103) 
note, any statement can be rendered into first-order logic by assigning 
that statement to a sentence letter. This, however, will not result in 
what they call ‘a formal representation of the inner structure’ of the 
statement (Baumgartner & Lampert 2008: 104). Thus, I interpret 
McGinn’s remark as follows: if we observe standard translational 
practice, and if (2)’s quantificational-logical form is to be captured, 
then no well-formed formula of standard first-order logic will be a 
candidate for being a formalization (whether adequate or otherwise) 
of (2). Section 2 argues against this position. 
According to Girle (2000: 58; 2003: 54), a predicate logic in 
which the quantifiers are interpreted as having existential import 
cannot deal adequately with (3): ‘The assumption of existential 
import will just leave us stranded for a translation of “Some things do 
not exist”’ (Girle 2000: 58). Girle does not claim that standard first-
order logic has quite the inadequacy in respect of (3) that McGinn 
appears to associate with (2). Instead, Girle has it that a classical-
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logical approach to (3) will result in a formula that is furnished by 
classical semantics with a different alethic status to (3) itself. This is 
the respect in which Girle takes the logic to be inadequate. Section 3 
concerns this issue. 
2. Formalizing quantified pure existentials 
For any language of first-order classical logic with identity, either it 
admits an existence predicate as a defined item of the language’s 
logical vocabulary or it does not. But whether it does or it does not, 
(3) is formalizable but logically false. (1) and (2) are quantificational 
truths. Thus, sentences like (1)–(3) do not sustain McGinn’s inade-
quacy charge. 




(3*) is logically false, provided that we treat ‘E’ as, like ‘=’, part of 
the logical vocabulary of the language and that we provide it with 
suitable and classically respectable inference rules or axioms.5 Let L 
be a standard system of classical quantificational logic with identity 
and without an existence predicate. Obtain L+ first by supplementing 
the logical vocabulary of L with ‘E’. Then, letting ‘n’ range over the 
individual constants of L, supplement the rules of inference of L as 
follows.6 
 
n = n (E-Introduction)  En (E-Elimination) 
En   n = n  
 
The provision of introduction and elimination rules for ‘E’ reflects the 
classical logician’s view that the notion of existence is a logical notion. 
Even with L+ at our disposal, the classical logician’s view that exis-
 
5 On the admission of an existence predicate into a language of first-order clas-
sical logic as part of the logical vocabulary, compare Evans (1982: 345), Bran-
quinho (1998: 26) and Mendelsohn (2005: 104–5). 
6 Compare Nakhnikian and Salmon (1957: 539). 
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tence is expressed by ‘’ is, as we are about to show, by no means 
under threat. Note, however, that the classical logician need not and 
does not hold that ‘some’ in English always has existential import. 
The word ‘and’ is an item of logical vocabulary when it expresses 
truth-functional conjunction. The classical logician need not, and 
typically does not, suppose that the word ‘and’ always so functions. 
Similarly, the word ‘some’ is an item of logical vocabulary when it 
functions as a quantifier. When the word ‘some’ functions as a quan-
tifier, it sometimes has existential import but (as will soon be shown) 
it does not always have existential import. Indeed, if the classical-
logical view required the generalisation that quantificational uses of 
‘some’ always had existential import then the neo-Meinongian’s task 
of refuting the classical-logical view would be way too easy. The 
classical logician does not and need not make this hard generalisation 
about natural languages. Producing a sentence in which a quantifica-
tional use of ‘some’ does not have existential import is insufficient to 
refute the classical-logical view. 
Given that we already have existential introduction at our disposal 
in L+, we have the following inference schemata: 
 
En  n = n 
x[Ex]  x[x = n] 
 
The negation of (3*) is a theorem of L+: 
 
— 1.  a = a =-Introduction 
— 2.  Ea 1, E-Introduction 
— 3.  xEx 2, -Introduction 
— 4.  ~x[~Ex] 3, Quantifier Equivalence 
 
Thus, given the soundness of L+, (3*) is a logical falsehood of L+. (1*) 
and (2*) are logical truths of L+. 
In a language of first-order classical logic without an existence 
predicate, a popular method, sometimes known as the ‘Hintikka-
Quine’ method, after Hintikka 1966 and Quine 1969, for translating 
singular existentials involves treating them as existentially quantified 
identity statements.7 Thus, ‘Girle exists’ is formalized as follows: 
 
7 Compare also Frege 1883? and Nakhnikian and Salmon (1957: 539). 
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x[x = g]. Working in a like manner, (1)–(3) are formalized as fol-
lows, each formula having the same alethic status in L as does its 
counterpart in L+: 
(1**) x[x = x] 
(2**) x[x = x] 
(3**) x[~(x = x)] 
The negation of (3**) is a theorem of L: 
— 1.  a = a  =-Introduction 
— 2.  x[x = x]  1, -Introduction 
— 3.  ~x[~(x = x)]  2, Quantifier Equivalence 
 
Given the soundness of L, the negation of (3**) is a logical truth of L, 
so (3**) is a logical falsehood of L. (1**) and (2**) are logical truths 
of L.8 
Thus, whether or not we add an existence predicate to standard 
classical quantificational logic with identity, (3) is formalizable but 
logically false (provided that we treat the existence predicate as a 
defined part of the logical vocabulary in the manner indicated above). 
More generally, (1) and (2) are, on each horn of the dilemma, logi-
cally true. For none of (1)–(3) is it the case that when we attempt to 
translate the sentence we are left without any well-formed formula 
that is a candidate for being an adequate formalization of the sentence.  
 
8 McGinn notes the ‘temptation’ to regard ‘something exists’ and ‘something 
is self-identical’ as synonymous (McGinn 2000: 27 note 13) and he observes that 
on this view (2**) is taken to translate (2). McGinn includes among his objections 
to this the claims that (2**) distorts the logical form of (2) and that the synonymy 
thesis is false. McGinn does not deal with the possibility of providing a translation 
of (2), as in (2*), via an existence predicate that is a defined item of the logical 
vocabulary. The thesis that (2*) and (2**) are logically equivalent, which is 
weaker than that of synonymy, is what the classical-logical account requires. Since 
his objections from logical form and from the synonymy thesis do not genuinely 
threaten the classical-logical account (even though Frege 1883? happened to 
support the synonymy thesis), the thesis of logical equivalence presents the point 
at which McGinn’s account and the classical-logical account differ. McGinn (2000: 
Chapters 1 & 2) has it that all objects are self-identical, but he holds that ‘Some 
things do not exist’ is true. I argue otherwise in Section 3. 
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Taking (2) as an example, it can be granted that (2*) more closely 
mirrors the logical form of (2) than does (2**). This is of minimal 
significance to the debate between defenders of a classical-logical 
approach to type (d) sentences and their opponents. Though they 
interpret (2*) differently, neither side in the debate has the monopoly 
on (2*) as a formula fit to capture the logical form of (2). 
3.  On ‘Some things do not exist’ 
3.1  To base the claim that ‘Some things do not exist’ is true on type (c) 
existentials is to beg the question 
Those who take (3) (‘Some things do not exist’) to be true do so on 
the basis of such sentences as: 
(4) Pegasus does not exist. (Type (a).) 
(5) Some characters in works of fiction do not exist. (Type (c).) 
This article focusses on the debate about the interpretation of the 
quantifiers in general sentences. It does not deal in detail with the 
question of whether negative existentials of type (a) entail (3), though 
it suggests a negative answer. 
Before proceeding to argue, mainly on the basis of considerations 
that concern general sentences, that (3) is indeed a logical falsehood, I 
will now argue that there is no type (c) sentence from which (3) can 
validly be inferred without begging the question on the issue of 
whether the ‘existential’ quantifier really has existential import. 
Consider: 
(6) Round squares do not exist. 
On the classical view, the inference from (6) to (3) is considered 
invalid.9 (6) is taken to be logically equivalent to  
(7) It is not the case that something is a round square. 
 
9 It is not intended to be significant to the argument that follows that it is 
‘Round squares’, rather than say ‘Ghosts’, that is in the subject-place in (6). 
‘Round squares’ was chosen in order, for rhetorical purposes, to make the argu-
ment from (6) to (3) as alike as is possible to an argument that is discussed in the 
subsection that follows. 
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(7*) ~x[Rx  Sx] 
On the classical view, from (7), and so from (6), (3) does not follow.  
Though McGinn (2000: 40) is a rare exception, most people on 
both sides of the debate grant the truth of (6). Assuming that (6) is 
taken to be true, the claim that the inference from (6) to (3) is valid 
cannot be used as a point against the classical logician’s view of quan-
tification. Rather, the claim to validity begs the question against the 
classical view since it involves a non-classical interpretation of (6). 
The theorist who does not admit that something is both round and 
square has no means to contend that the argument from (6) to (3) is 
sound. For the particularist, unlike for the classical logician, (6) is 
(strictly speaking), like ‘Andalusians are gregarious’, a quantification-
ally ambiguous sentence containing no quantifier.10 The particularist 
denies that ‘’ expresses existence and (typically) denies that EXIST is 
a quantifier. Accordingly, the particularist must interpret (6) in a 
manner that accords with either (8) or (9): 
(8) All round squares are non-existent. 
(8*) x[(Rx  Sx)  Ex] 
 
(9) Some round squares are non-existent. 
(9*) x[(RxSx) Ex] 
If (6) is interpreted along the lines of (8), then so long as the particu-
larist accepts the classical-logical view that ‘All As are Bs’ does not 
entail ‘Some As are Bs’, the particularist has no available argument 
from (6) to (3). It is only if the informal interpretation of (6) includes 
commitment to (9) that it can be claimed that (6) both entails (3) and 
is true. The premise, so interpreted, cannot be accepted by the 
classical logician: it begs the question.11 
Now someone might reason as follows: ‘The charge of begging the 
question cuts both ways. In viewing (6) as translatable using “” and 
no existence predicate, the classical logician already presumes the 
falsehood of (3).’ This charge is unjustified. From the fact, if it is one, 
 
10 Compare Branquinho (1998: 11). 
11 Likewise, inferring ‘Some things do not exist’ from ‘Ghosts do not exist’ 
requires an informal interpretation of ‘Ghosts do not exist’ according to which 
something is a ghost and non-existent. 
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that true negative existentials of type (c) do not entail (3) it does not 
follow that no sentence does so. Stirton (1995: 40) writes: 
It is not hard to see that the usual way of translating existential state-
ments into the predicate calculus will achieve material equivalence in 
every case only if there are no non-existent objects. Thus ‘x.Sx’, 
where ‘S’ means ‘santaclausizes’, will have the same truth-value as 
‘Santa Claus exists’ only if there is no object which, while not existing, 
nevertheless santaclausizes. The technical trick of using the existential 
quantifier to translate existence-statements does not, by itself, prove 
that there are no non-existent objects; it rather presupposes that there 
are none. 
Stirton’s observation that using the existential quantifier (and no 
primitive existence predicate) as a device for translating all existen-
tials presupposes that (3) is false is correct, since using the existential 
quantifier (and no primitive existence predicate) for translating type 
(a) sentences and type (d) sentences presupposes that (3) is false. The 
classical-logical analysis of type (c) sentences like (6), however, does 
not of itself require any stance on the issue of whether (3) is true. On 
the other hand, the point stands that the claim that ‘some’ and ‘’ are 
existentially neutral in (3) cannot cogently be based on true type (c) 
sentences like (6). 
3.2  Impossibilia 
‘The assumption of existential import’, writes Girle, results in the 
following sentence being ruled to be ‘utterly self-contradictory’ 
(Girle 2003: 55): 
(10) Some things, such as round squares, are impossible. 
Girle does not dwell on the matter, but he appears to be making a 
rhetorical point in favour of viewing the particular quantifier as 
existentially neutral.12 Girle’s claim about the assumption of existen-
 
12 McGinn (2000: 35) supports the view that the quantifier is existentially 
neutral. Also, McGinn is ‘inclined to take the following line: [some] impossible 
objects […] do exist, but what they lack is the possibility of actuality —they are 
existent entities that could not be actual’ (McGinn 2000: 40). This view on impos-
sibilia is not discussed in what follows. 
First-order logic and some existential sentences 265
tial import and (10) is correct if (10) is interpreted in a manner that 
accords with (10*):  
(10*) x[Rx & Sx] & ~x[Rx & Sx] 
(10*) is a logical falsehood in the classically-based quantificational 
modal logics with reflexive accessibility (i.e., in those normal modal 
logics which include axiom (M):  A A). 
In the absence of a logic for ‘such as’, and since the belief that (10) 
expresses a truth that involves none but first-order quantifiers would 
appear to rest upon inference from ‘Round squares are impossible’ to 
‘Some things are impossible’, let us consider these two sentences.  
(11) Round squares are impossible. 
(12) Some things are impossible. 
(11) would normally be formalized in quantified modal logic as 
follows (or as an equivalent formula):  
(11*) ~x[Rx & Sx] 
No existential formula that is a candidate for being a formalization of 
(12) follows from this. In order to derive one, (11) has to be infor-
mally interpreted in a manner that includes commitment to:  
(13) Something is round and square, and it is impossible that it ex-
ists. 
(13*) x[(Rx Sx) Ex] 
(13*) entails the following formalization of (12):  
(12*) x[Ex] 
When (11*) is deemed, in this manner, to be an incorrect formaliza-
tion of (11), it is already taken for granted that ‘’ does not express 
existence.13 
Now there is a non-literal interpretation of (10) on which the sen-
tence expresses a truth. (10) can be interpreted as equivalent to ‘For 
some Meinongian objects, such as round squares, it is impossible that 
 
13 Compare the discussion of the argument from (6) to (3), in Section 3.1. 
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those objects exist’. The defender of a classical-logical account of 
quantification will deny that ‘For some’ has, at the level of logical 
form, wide scope here and will deny that ‘Meinongian’ is a qualifying 
adjective. Instead, ‘Meinongian’ is, in this context, transformable into 
a fictional operator. Thus we have: ‘According to Meinongianism, for 
some objects, such as round squares, it is impossible that those ob-
jects exist’. This sentence does not commit us to quantification over 
round squares or other Meinongian objects and taking it to be true 
does not require that the classical conception of first-order quantifica-
tion be relinquished.  
(10) was of interest to us primarily because Girle (2003: 55) 
raised it in the context of his discussion of (3) and because of the 
parallels between the argument from (11) to (12) and the argument 
from (6) to (3). If the arguments I have advanced are sound, neither 
argument is fit to feature in any good critique of the adequacy of 
standard first-order logic with respect to existentials of type (d). 
3.3  ‘Some things do not exist’ again 
According to Girle, ‘If English quantifiers have existential import’, 
then (3) ‘“really” means […the self-contradictory] At least one existing 
thing does not exist’ (Girle 2003: 54). Though Girle appeals to natural 
language only here, his remark is readily adaptable, as is suggested by 
Girle (2000: 58), to the classical-logical approach to (3) set out in 
Section 2 above. 
Girle holds that, contrary to the classical-logical account, (3) 
‘seems to be a reasonable enough thing to say’ (Girle 2000: 58); 
(Girle 2003: 54). Indeed, he describes (3) as ‘perfectly sensible (and 
true)’ (Girle 2003: 55). 
In relation to sentences such as (3) and (10), consider the hypothe-
sis that those who are not educated in these matters are sensitive 
neither to the distinction between objectual and substitutional quanti-
fication nor to that between first-order and higher-order quantifica-
tion. In accordance with this hypothesis, a speaker might endorse, in 
one context, a claim such as (3) and, in another, one that is (on a 
first-order, objectual interpretation) inconsistent with it, such as (1) 
(‘Everything exists’). For example, someone might, while endorsing 
(1), think that (3) is true because they take ‘things’ in it to range over 
kinds and they hold that unicorns do not exist. (Formally, they are 
interpreting (3) as: F[x[Fx]].) The thinkers whose view I am 
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opposing, however, are arguing that (3) is a literal truth when its 
quantifier is interpreted as an objectual, first-order quantifier and 
that, accordingly, some objects are non-existent (and so (1) is false). 
Appeal to pre-theoretical intuition about the truth-value of (3) should 
have little real bearing on whether (3), as (for example) Girle inter-
prets it, is true. While I put little dialectical store by the point, since 
even those with the most outlandish philosophical views claim com-
mon sense to be on their side, the considerations just indicated sug-
gest that the interpretation of (3) as a true sentence involving, as its 
only quantifier, an occurrence of ‘some’ that is a first-order quantifier 
with wide scope is probably distant from common-sense interpreta-
tions on which (3) is true. 
If someone utters (3) and intends to convey that some things that 
are purported to exist do not exist then their utterance is not neces-
sarily in conflict with the classical-logical account. To be purportedly 
a thing is not to be a thing, just as to be a fictional object is not to be 
an object. The classical logician need not and does not hold that every 
occurrence of ‘Some things’ at the start of an English sentence ought 
to be translated by an occurrence of ‘’ plus a variable, since the 
classical logician, as is familiar, takes it that surface syntax does not 
always lay bare logical syntax. The exponent of a classical-logical 
account of first-order quantification can accept as true such sentences 
as ‘Some purported things do not exist’ and ‘Some characters in 
works of fiction do not exist’: to do so does not entail commitment to 
quantification over intentional objects, since the classical logician’s 
analysis of the sentences in question will not view ‘Some purported 
things’ and ‘Some characters in works of fiction’, as expressions that 
really quantify over purported things or characters in works of fiction 
in these sentences.14 
One strategy (which I take, with Sainsbury (2005, 2009), to be 
promising) for accepting these sentences as true invokes fictional 
operators. It is entailed by sentences in the script for an episode of 
The Simpsons entitled ‘The Regina Monologues’, when those sentences 
are taken literally, that Bart Simpson exists and that Tony Blair ex-
ists.15 According to ‘The Regina Monologues’, Tony Blair exists and 
 
14 The objection to which I am responding here was pressed, in discussion, by 
Kit Fine and John Skorupski. 
15 Source: http://www.cnn.com/2003/SHOWBIZ/TV/11/22/blair.simpsons/index.html. 
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Bart Simpson exists, though in fact Tony Blair exists and it is not the 
case that Bart Simpson exists.  
From ‘It is not the case that Bart Simpson exists’ (3) does not fol-
low. My reason for thinking this takes us away not from a classical-
logical approach to quantification, but from the standard classical-
logical account of negation. Where ‘a’ is a name, the standard classi-
cal account of negation allows for no semantic difference between 
sentences of the form ‘It is not the case that a is F’ and sentences of 
the form ‘a is not F’. 
Supposing that ‘Some characters in works of fiction do not exist’ is 
true, this does not require the non-existence of some objects. All it 
requires is the literal falsehood of some grammatically singular exis-
tentials that are entailed by the literal interpretations of fictional 
utterances and works.  
The opponent of a classical-logical approach to type (c) sentences 
might at this stage reason as follows. 
Granted, no type (c) sentence can serve as a reason for taking (3) 
to be true. However, the claim against your favoured analysis of 
(3) can be weakened as follows. Even if there is no reason what-
ever to take (3) to be true, it does not follow that (3) is logically 
false. It is the deeming of (3) as logically false that is objectionable. 
I grant that (3) is not as evidently logically false as is, for example  
(14) Something is both round and not round. 
If (3) were as evidently logically false as (14), then there would be no 
such debate as the one in which I am engaging. It is worth presenting, 
then, a final reason for resisting any intuition that (3) is not logically 
false. Existence can be denied using the expression ‘Nothing’, as in 
‘Nothing is both round and square’. Now if ‘Something’ is existen-
tially neutral then ‘Nothing’, which is presumably its logical opposite, 
is presumably also existentially neutral. This, however, conflicts 
strongly with the fact that existence is often actually denied using the 
latter expression. 
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4. Conclusion 
Type (d) sentences that do not involve higher-order quantification are 
not among the sentences that cannot be rendered into standard first-
order logic. When the quantifiers involved are interpreted as first-
order objectual quantifiers, there is no cogent argument from any 
type (c) sentence as premise to (3) as conclusion. Negative existen-
tials of type (a) that might be taken to entail (3) may be more prob-
lematic. If so then it is those sentences, which have only been consid-
ered in passing here, that present standard first-order logic with a 
genuine problem. Type (d) sentences are not a fruitful resource for 
employment in arguments for the inadequacy of standard first-order 
logic with respect to the first-order existentials of natural languages.16 
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